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ON TERRORISM AND WHSTLEBLOWING
Michael P. Schar! & Colin T. McLaughlin'
At a Bio-Terrorism Conference at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law on March 31, 2006, the government participants were
asked what they would do if a superior instructed them not to disclose in-
formation to the public about the likely grave health affects of an ongoing
bio-terrorist attack. In response, they indicated that they would be reluc-
tant to become a "whistleblower. " This is not surprising since, despite the
federal and state laws that purport to facilitate such whistleblowing for the
public good, government whistleblowers routinely have faced loss of pro-
motion, harassment, firing, and in some instances criminal prosecution
when they have gone public with their important information. Yet, without
government whistleblowers who had the courage to go to the press, the
public would never have learned about Watergate, the Iran-Contra scan-
dal, the inhumane practices at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the secret pris-
ons run by the United States in Eastern Europe, or the NSA policy of wire-
tapping Americans without warrants. These disclosures initiated vital pub-
lic debate and prompted corrective actions and reforms. The authors ar-
gue that the government whistleblower who in good faith discloses infor-
mation to the press should no longer be treated as an enemy of the state,
and provide a legislative proposal to give them a greater degree ofprotec-
tion from retaliation than exists under current legislation.
Excerpt from "The Fifth Plague" Bioterrorism Conference: Panel Discus-
sion:t
MICHAEL P. SCHARF: The students who work with Professor Guiora and
me at Case School of Law prepare research memoranda for five in-
" Michael P. Scharf is Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox Interna-
tional Law Center, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Scharf served as Attor-
ney-Adviser for United Nations Affairs during the Administrations of George H.W. Bush
and Bill Clinton. First person references in this article are to Professor Scharf.
I Colin McLaughlin, JD, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, served as
Assistant to Judge Rend Blattmann, the Second Vice President of the International Criminal
Court, The Hague.
I "The Fifth Plague" archived webcast is available at http://www.law.case.edu/centers/
cox/webcast.asp?dt=-20060331&type=wmv. Panelists for this discussion included: Melanie
Wilt, Public Information Officer, Office of Communications, Ohio Department of Agricul-
ture (ODA); Amos Guiora, Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Global Security Law
and Policy, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; and Charles J. Couch, Public
Affairs Branch Chief, Ohio Emergency Management Agency (OEMA).
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ternational criminal tribunals and also for the military commission
that is prosecuting al Qaeda. Many of the cases involve the "obedi-
ence to orders" defense. The general rule is that a soldier or gov-
ernment official has a duty to disobey a manifestly unlawful order.
My question for the information officers on the panel is: let us as-
sume that your superior tells you not to disclose the existence of a
bio-terrorist health threat to the press and to mislead or lie to the
press if asked about the situation in order to avoid hysteria, and you
believe that it really is necessary to get the actual story out for the
public good, to protect lives and safety. Would you go public and
blow the whistle?
MELANIE WILT: One of the things I learned earlier on with media relations
is to not become part of the story. I do not want that story tomorrow
to be about me; I do not want it to be about my director; and I do
not want it to be about how my department has failed. So part of my
job internally-and this is not the public part of my job, but the in-
ternal part of my job-is that if my director or my superiors are sit-
ting around a table making policy decisions, and if I see that they
are making a terrible mistake in a policy decision, I am going to say
that. It is my responsibility to bring it to their attention that they are
making a mistake.
AMOS GuIORA: Mr. Couch, do you want to add something to that?
CHARLES COUCH: I think it is absolutely true. As information officers, we
have an ethical responsibility to get that kind of information out.
We will get it out or we will find new jobs.
PROF. SCHARF: And if you quit, do you then tell the press?
MS. WILT: I guess you would have to ask me that when I was faced with
that decision. I think that is something that you would personally
struggle with. And at some point you either make a decision that
could potentially put you in jail, about what you released, or you
decide to keep it to yourself. I guess I could not make that decision
unless I was forced to.
I. INTRODUCTION
In my role as Co-Chair of "The Fifth Plague Conference," a unique
bioterrorism simulation held at Case Western Reserve University School of
[Vol. 38:567
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Law on March 31, 2006,' I asked the government members of the expert
panel what they would do if their superiors ordered them not to disclose
information to the public about the likely grave health affects of an ongoing
bio-terrorist attack. "Would you go public and blow the whistle?" I in-
quired.2 One of the panelists answered that her agency encouraged honest
dissent, and that she would argue strenuously for public release of such in-
formation. Another said that if push came to shove, he would resign rather
than be part of an unethical cover up. "And if you quit, would you then go
to the press," I asked. "I guess I could not make that decision unless I was
forced to," the official replied.
This exchange did not give me much comfort. I had served as At-
torney-Advisor for United Nations Affairs at the U.S. Department of State
in 1992, when we began to receive classified reports from reliable sources
that the Serbs were engaged in a genocidal campaign against the Moslems
of Bosnia. Because senior Administration officials desired to keep the
United States out of the Balkan conflict, my colleagues and I were rebuffed
in our internal efforts to get the State Department to release this grave in-
formation to the public.
In March 1993 I helped draft a legal memorandum, which was
"cleared" throughout the Office of the Legal Adviser, opining that the in-
formation we possessed was sufficient to legally conclude that a one-sided,
well organized campaign of genocide was taking place in Bosnia. Notwith-
standing this memorandum, Secretary of State Warren Christopher refused
to use "the G word" and instead continued to publicly insist that "all sides
had committed atrocities" and that Bosnia was essentially an "ethnic feud.
'A
"It's somewhat different from the Holocaust .... I never heard of any geno-
cide by the Jews against the German people," Secretary Christopher as-
serted at a Congressional Hearing in May 1993 in response to the question,
"Doesn't ethnic cleansing qualify as genocide?
5
The several dozen intelligence analysts, foreign policy experts, and
legal officers who were working with me on the Bosnian conflict at that
1 In the simulation, a virulent strain of hoof and mouth disease was introduced to a farm
in Northeast Ohio, and began to spread throughout the region. Developments during the
simulation were communicated to the expert participants via simulated television news
broadcasts, produced by Classic Video Productions.
2 As used in this article "whistleblowing" is the public release of internal information by a
lower-level government official about a situation that poses a danger to public health or
safety, over the objections of superiors. "Whistleblowing" is distinguishable from "leaking"
in that the whistleblower publicly identifies herself as the source of the information.
3 The classified information has subsequently been de-classified and released to the pub-
lic.
4 Editorial, Bosnia and Conscience, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 31, 1993, at 18.
5 Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Goal on Bosnia: Keeping War Within Borders, N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 1993, at A10.
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time knew Secretary Christopher was intentionally obscuring the truth about
Bosnia. The purpose of doing so was to allow the Administration to main-
tain that there was no moral imperative for U.S. military intervention in
Bosnia. Both Secretary Christopher and President Clinton feared that
American casualties in Bosnia would sink the Administration's plans for
health care reform, crime prevention, and education, much as the Vietnam
War had derailed President Lyndon Baines Johnson's ambitious domestic
agenda.6
In the face of our superior's opposition, my State Department col-
leagues and I tried several tactics during the summer of 1993 to get the in-
formation to the public. First, we circulated draft press guidance explicitly
acknowledging that ethnic cleansing was in fact genocide. But our superiors
on the seventh floor would not approve the text. Next, a "Dissent Channel
Memorandum," signed by two dozen State Department experts, was sent to
the Secretary of State to make our case, but the Secretary of State still re-
fused to budge. 7 Finally, several mid-level State Department officers re-
signed in protest-the most resignations over a policy dispute since Viet-
nam. 8 The State Department typically responded by characterizing the res-
ignations as the impetuous actions of a few "young" Foreign Service offi-
cers who were "frustrated at being left out of the formulation of policy"9
and asserting that the resignations "will not have any substantial impact on
our policy-making."10 Yet, if the resignations did not immediately change
U.S. policy, they did turn up the heat. Finally, three years later, a CIA study
6 See PAUL R. WILLIAMS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE? WAR CRIMES AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 67 (2002).
7 See generally Mary Curtius, Foreign Service Ire on Bosnia Recalls Vietnam, Officials
Say, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 25, 1993, at 13 (describing the dissatisfaction in the State De-
partment over President Clinton's Bosnia policy). A Dissent Channel Memorandum is a
rarely used mechanism which provides an avenue for lower level officials to communicate
directly with the Secretary of State when their superiors in the chain of command refuse to
sign off on their recommendations via the normal channel of a Decision Memorandum. Re-
sort to the Dissent Channel is extremely rare because it generates resentment on the part of
superiors, who are in a position to stifle promotions.
8 The resigning officials included George Kenney (age 36), Deputy head of the Bosnia
Desk; Marshall Harris (age 32), head of the Bosnia Desk; Jon Western (age 30) of the Intel-
ligence and Research Bureau; and Steven Walker (age 30), the head of the Croatian Desk.
See Norman Kempster, 4th U.S. Aide Quits over Balkan Policy, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 24,
1993; Daniel Williams, A Third State Dept. Official Resigns over Balkan Policy, WASH.
POST, Aug. 24, 1993, at Al. One of the officials who resigned, Marshall Harris, told the
press, "It's genocide and the secretary of state won't identify it as such. That's where we get
beyond the political to the moral." Id.
9 See, e.g., Steven A. Holmes, State Dept. Expert on Croatia Resigns to Protest Policy in
Balkans, N.Y. TIMES, August 24, 1993, at A6.
10 Simon Tisdall, Resignation Reveals US Split over Bosnia, THE GUARDIAN (LONDON),
Aug. 6, 1993, at 8.
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was leaked to the press, indicating that ninety percent of ethnic cleansing
had been carried out by Serbs pursuant to a policy designed to destroy the
Moslem population in Bosnia.' During those three years of denial and ob-
fuscation, 250,000 Moslem civilians were systematically exterminated.
Subsequently, the Clinton Administration reversed course and decided to
use force against the Serbs, leading to the Dayton Peace Accord, and ulti-
mately the downfall of Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic who was prosecuted
for genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia.
1 2
Having observed well-intentioned high level government officials
suppress evidence and mislead the public about the existence of genocide in
Bosnia in 1993, I would not be surprised if public safety and emergency
management officials instructed subordinates during a bio-terrorism attack
to mislead the media in order to avoid public panic before the government
was ready to deal with the crisis. As this article documents, the current laws
enacted to facilitate whistleblowing and protect government whistleblowers
from retaliation have largely failed to achieve their.purpose. The Supreme
Court, meanwhile, has held that government employees are not protected by
the First Amendment if they expose government wrongdoing to the press,
and the Bush Administration is aggressively pursuing the prosecution of
government whistleblowers and their media outlets. Consequently, it is ex-
tremely unlikely that a lower level public safety or emergency management
official would ever go public with information about a public health hazard
in opposition to a superior's wishes. This article surveys the importance of
past incidents of government whistleblowing and makes the case for
stronger protections for government whistleblowers in the future, especially
in the context of the government's war on terrorism.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF WHISTLEBLOWING
The Founding Fathers recognized that the Executive Branch of gov-
ernment would be prone to secrecy and corruption if not checked and bal-
anced by the other branches of government. 3 From exposing environmental
hazards in the 1970s to disclosing foreign policy scandals and Presidential
abuse of power in the last five years, whistleblowing has played an impor-
11 Id.
12 See generally MICHAEL P. SCHARF & WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC ON
TRIAL: A COMPANION (2002) (detailing the events preceding Milosevic's prosecution for
genocide and the prosecution itself).
13 See W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 116-28 (1965); Mal-
colm P. Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHI.
L. REv. 385, 394-414 (1935) (describing the Founding Fathers' thoughts on separation of
powers).
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tant part in achieving the transparency necessary for the American system of
checks and balances to operate.
In the 1970s, a courageous EPA official named Hugh Kaufman
launched the first major whistleblowing effort against environmental haz-
ards. 14 Kaufman was able to discover several toxic waste sites that posed
severe health risks. After realizing that his superiors in the Carter Admini-
stration were not supportive of pollution control, Kaufman created a paper
trail on toxic contamination at Love Canal and other locations, prompting
hearings by six congressional committees.15 Kaufman's revelations later led
to the resignation of EPA administrator Anne Burford and the perjury con-
viction of Superfund chief Rita Lavelle. Yet, rather than award Kaufman for
this public service, his superiors responded by denying him any more grade
promotions or management responsibilities. 16
Because whistleblowers are so often subjected to the type of inter-
nal retaliation that befell Hugh Kaufman, until recently, major cases of
whistleblowing were considered rare. However, since the U.S. declared its
"global war on terrorism" five years ago, there have been three well-
publicized instances of whistleblowing: the revelations of the abuses at Abu
Ghraib prison, the exposure of "CIA Black Sites" in Eastern Europe, and
the disclosure of the highly controversial NSA domestic wiretap program.
The first of these cases emerged with the release of the Abu Ghraib
torture photographs. In January 2004, Sergeant Joseph M. Darby of the U.S.
Army's 372nd Military Police Company asked Specialist Charles A. Gra-
ner, Jr. if he could download digital pictures that Graner had taken while in
Iraq. Darby had requested to see pictures of the aftermath of a prison riot
that had occurred while he was on leave.'17 Instead, he was given the now
infamous Abu Ghraib torture photos. "It violated everything that I person-
ally believed in and everything that I had been taught about the rules of
war," he said.18 The decision to turn over the pictures was not easy for
Darby, since it involved implicating his friends and superiors in serious
military violations.' 9 The photos, which were widely circulated on the inter-
14 See Judith A. Truelson, Whistleblowers and Their Protection, in HANDBOOK OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ETHICS 285, 299 (Terry L. Cooper ed., 1994).
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See 'Moral Call' Led GI Whistleblower: Testifies Iraqi Prisoner Abuse 'Violated Every-
thing I Believed In,' CBS NEWS, Aug. 6, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/08/19/
iraq/printable636932.shtml.
18 John Shattuck, On Abu Ghraib: One Sergeant's Courage a Model for US Leaders,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 16, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/
05 16/p09s02-coop.html.
19 See 'Moral Call' Led GI Whistleblower: Testifies Iraqi Prisoner Abuse 'Violated Every-




net and then broadcast on CBS's "60 Minutes" in April 2004, showed naked
detainees stacked in human pyramids, posed in sexual positions, hooked to
electrodes, and tethered to dog leashes. Darby received equal amounts of
praise and grief. Officially, Darby was commended in a military report for
promptly alerting his superiors.2 ° Outside of the military, Darby was given
the Kennedy Library Foundation's Profile in Courage Award,2' and also
named one of the People of the Year by ABC News.22 Yet, at the same time,
Darby and his relatives received multiple death threats, which required that
they seek continuous government protection.23
Soon after the abuses at Abu Ghraib were exposed, the efforts of
another government whistleblower brought the existence of "CIA Black
Sites" to the world's attention. These Black Sites were established through-
out Eastern Europe to enable the United States to use "extraordinary meas-
ures of interrogation" on captured suspected al Qaeda terrorists outside of
the reach of United States laws and the media. Journalist Dana Priest of the
Washington Post broke the story in November 2005 and was awarded a
Pulitzer Prize for her reporting.24 Her main source, Mary McCarthy, a
member of the CIA's inspector general's office, did not fare as well. In-
stead, McCarthy was fired after failing a polygraph exam concerning the
leaked information in April 2006.25 CIA spokeswoman Jennifer Millerwise
Dyck said that the firing was based on the fact that McCarthy had provided
classified information to the media in violation of the CIA secrecy agree-
ment, which prohibits CIA employees from discussing classified informa-
tion with anyone not cleared to obtain the material.26
Then, a year later, a National Security Agency employee of twenty
years named Russell Tice blew the whistle on the NSA's domestic wiretap-
20 Praise for Iraq Whistleblower, CBS News, May 10, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/
stories/2004/05/I0/iraq/printable616660.shtml.
21 Shattuck, supra note 18.
22 Elizabeth Vargas, People of the Year: Joseph Darby: Whistleblower Revealed Abuse at
Iraq's Abu Ghraib Prison, ABC NEWS, Dec. 28, 2004, http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/print?id
=365920.
23 Shattuck, supra note 18; Chris Shumway, Family of Abu Ghraib Whistleblower Gets
Death Threats, THE NEWSTANDARD, Aug. 16, 2004, http://newstandardnews.net/content/ind
ex.cfm/items/83 1/printmode/true.
24 Robert Windrem & Andrea Mitchell, CIA Officer Fired After Leak: Officer Allegedly
Failed Polygraph, Admitted Giving Reporter Information, NBC NEWS, Apr. 21, 2006, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/1 2423825/print/l/displaymode/1 098/.
25 See id.
26 See R. Jeffrey Smith, Fired Officer Believed CIA Lied to Congress, WASH. POST, May
14, 2006, at Al.
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ping program.27 The revelations that the NSA was tapping the phone con-
versations of thousands of Americans without obtaining a warrant from the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court led to Congressional Hearings re-
sulting in draft legislation to modify the practice and a federal judicial deci-
sion holding that the practice violated federal law and the U.S. Constitu-
tion.28 The NSA fired Tice and threatened him with criminal prosecution if
he testified in front of Congress.29
III. WHISTLEBLOWING AND THE GOVERNMENT LAWYER
None of the above cases involved a government lawyer as whistle-
blower. Indeed, when my State Department colleagues resigned in 1993, I
knew that as a member of the Office of Legal Adviser I could not join them
in publicly protesting the Secretary of State's refusal to acknowledge that
genocide was being committed in Bosnia. That is because, at the time, the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct "forbade
lawyers from revealing confidential information acquired during the course
of representing a client., 30 This "representation" was defined to include the
attorney's "supervisor in the department or agency, the agency itself, the
statutory mission of the agency, the entire government of which the agency
is part, and the public interest."31
In its original form, Model Rule 1.6 stated that a lawyer must not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client
gives informed consent for such disclosure. The only exception to Model
Rule 1.6 was that a lawyer could reveal information in order to prevent a
criminal act that was "likely to result in imminent death or substantial bod-
ily harm.",32 Since there was technically no criminal act in my case (Secre-
tary Christopher's Congressional statements were misleading but did not
amount to perjury), my hands were tied-though the government's non-
action was certainly likely to result in imminent death on a mass scale. Nine
27 See Brian Ross, NSA Whistleblower Alleges Illegal Spying: Former Employee Admits to
Being a Source for The New York Times, ABC NEWS, Jan. 10, 2006, http://www.abcnews.
go.com/WNT/print?id= 1491889 [hereinafter Ross].
28 ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006). See Charles
Babington, Specter Proposes NSA Surveillance Rules, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 2006, at All;
see generally National Security Surveillance Act of 2006, S. 2453, 109th Cong. (2006).
29 See Ross, supra note 27.
30 Jesselyn Radack, The Government Attorney- "histleblower and the Rule of Confidenti-
ality: Compatible at Last, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125, 126 (2003). The Model Rules have
been adopted by most of the State Bar Associations and are therefore binding on government
attorneys throughout the United States. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers'Ethics
in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CH. L. REv. 1293, 1293 n. 1 (1987).
31 Radack supra note 30, at 126-27.
32 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1996).
[Vol. 38:567
TERRORISM AND WHISTLEBLOWING
years later, in 2002, Model Rule 1.6 was amended to expand the exceptions
to the non-disclosure rule.33 Specifically, the amended Rule 1.6(b) allows
lawyers to reveal information that the lawyer reasonably believes is neces-
sary "to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm,"
whether or not the situation was the result of a criminal act.34 Under this
change, government lawyers may have freer reign to blow the whistle in
cases of wrongdoing or abuse or misuse of power.
IV. WHISTLEBLOWING PROTECTION STATUTES
As the above cases indicate, without whistleblowing, some of the
major scandals of our time would never have been disclosed. Recognizing
the importance of facilitating whistleblowing in appropriate cases, in 1978
Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act, which created a formal
whistleblowing disclosure channel through the Office of Special Counsel
(OSC). 35 The Special Counsel screens whistleblowers' disclosures for com-
pleteness, accuracy, and reasonableness, and can trigger an intensive reform
process and protect whistleblowers from retaliation when the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) finds that the whistleblowers' claim has merit.
36
The MSPB defines whistleblowing as "disclosing information that
you reasonably believe is evidence of a violation of any law, rule, or regula-
tion, or gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. 37 Thus, the
MSPB definition of whistleblowing is much broader than that of the ABA
Model Rules discussed above. However, the Civil Service Reform Act spe-
cifically prohibits disclosure of information to the press or Congress when
the information relates to national defense or the conduct of foreign af-
fairs.38 Moreover, employees of key government agencies such as the GAO,
the FBI, NSA, and CIA are excluded from whistleblower coverage, thus
significantly limiting the scope of this law.39
On paper, the federal whistleblowing law prohibits a federal agency
official from taking adverse actions against an employee who has blown the
33 See Radack, supra note 30, at 133.
34 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2003).
35 See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 §§ 101-105, 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2305 (2006); 5
U.S.C. § 1213 (2006).
36 See Truelson, supra note 14, at 289 (describing the powers and procedures of the OSC
and MSPB in addressing whistleblower protection claims by federal employees).
37 U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Questions and Answers About Whistleblower
Appeals, http://www.mspb.gov/foia/forms-pubs/qawhistle.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).
" 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(ii) (2006).
'9 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) (2000). In 1998, Congress enacted the Intelligence Com-
munity Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, which creates a process to facilitate internal
whistleblowing within the CIA.
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whistle on a violation of law or rule, or gross mismanagement, gross waste
of funds, abuse of authority, or substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety.40 In order to trigger the protections of the law, however, the
MSPB has to find the following: (1) an employee was engaged in a pro-
tected activity; (2) the employee was subsequently treated in an adverse
fashion by the agency; (3) the deciding official had knowledge of the pro-
tected activity; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected
activity and the agency's adverse treatment of the employee. Unfortunately,
under the 1978 law, the burden of proof required by the MSPB to establish a
reprisal action left most whistleblowers unprotected. In fact, between 1979
and 1984, only about one percent of complaints filed by federal employees
against reprisals for whistleblowing met the standards of proof and resulted
in any corrective or disciplinary action.41 With this ninety-nine percent fail-
ure rate, few employees were protected from reprisals. Both Congress and
the GAO criticized the OSC/MSPB for failing to protect whistleblowers as
42well as failing to discipline victimizers.
In an attempt to ameliorate the problems created by the 1978 law,
Congress enacted the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) of 1989. The
WPA protects employees who report wrongdoing if they "reasonably be-
lieve" there is misconduct. This relaxed burden of proof was intended to
facilitate an increase in whistleblowing, and a 1992 survey conducted by the
MSPB indicates that whistleblowing has in fact increased somewhat. While
in 1983 only thirty percent of employees who had observed or obtained
direct evidence of fraud, waste, or abuse actually reported the incident, the
1992 survey found that the figure had risen to fifty percent.43 Employees
who did not report stated two main reasons for not doing so: (1) they did not
believe anything would be done to correct the situation or (2) they thought
they might be subjected to reprisals. 44 Of those employees that had reported
some type of illegal or wasteful activity, thirty-seven percent said that they
had been threatened with or had experienced some sort of reprisal.45 The
MSPB report also disclosed that of those employees who took actions to
combat reprisals through the MSPB process, only nine percent said the
threat of reprisal was withdrawn, while forty-five percent indicated that they
had encountered more reprisals. 46 Finally, the report found that seventy-
40 See Radack, supra note 30, at 135-36.
41 See Truelson, supra note 14, at 295.
42 See id.
43 See U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, WHISTLEBLOWING IN THE FEDERAL







eight percent of employees observed another employee simply tolerating
situations or practices that posed a danger to public health or safety.
Then, in 1999 the Federal Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
ruled that federal employees are presumed to conduct themselves in accor-
dance with the law, unless there is "irrefragable proof to the contrary.
' 'A7
This ruling had a significant adverse impact on whistleblowing cases. After
this ruling, only seven percent of whistleblower cases brought to the MSPB
were successful, compared to a thirty-six percent success rate prior to the
ruling.48 On the heels of this ruling, the MSPB conducted another survey in
2000 on whistleblowing. The results showed that forty-four percent of em-
ployees who made a formal disclosure felt that they were retaliated against,
an increase from the thirty-seven percent found in the 1992 survey.49 Fur-
thermore, sixty-one percent of employees who made a formal appeal against
retaliation believed they were further retaliated against for their actions,
which is again much higher than the forty-five percent in 1992.50
Based on these studies, one can conclude that the whistleblowing
protection framework has done little in the past two decades to protect gov-
ernment employees who blow the whistle or who try to combat retaliation
against them for blowing the whistle. Beth Daley, an investigator for the
Project on Government Oversight (POGO) explains, "The laws on the
books give the impression that people have somewhere to turn and they'll be
protected, but they don't.",51 This problem is intensified during war time, as
Louis Fisher, a senior specialist in the separation of powers at the Congres-
sional Research Service, observed, "[W]hen you concentrate power, the
chance of abuse and mistakes increases. 52
Despite the weaknesses of the federal legislation, whistleblower
protection statutes modeled on the Federal laws have been enacted in each
of the fifty states, with the same objective: "to expose, deter, and curtail
wrongdoing., 53 It is important to note that none of these statutes identifies
the media as a proper recipient of a whistleblower's information. And like
the federal law, twenty-one state whistleblower laws do not protect reports
47 Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1153 (2000)
(citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Johnson, 8 F.3d 791, 795 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
48 Alexandra Marks, National Security vs. Whistle-blowing, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Jan. 24, 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0124/p02s01-uspo.html [hereinaf-
ter Marks].
49 U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY: RESULTS OF THE MERIT PRINCIPLES SURVEY 2000, at 35 (2003).
50 Id.
51 Marks, supra note 48.
52 Id.
53 Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State Whistleblower
Protection, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 99, 100 (2000).
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to the media, designating a governmental entity as the only appropriate re-
cipient of reported misconduct.
54
V.RECENT SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
While the Federal and State whistleblowing laws thus provide little
real protection, one might surmise that the First Amendment would safe-
guard whistleblowers from retaliation for releasing information about gov-
ernmental mal- or misfeasance to the media. Such a possibility was dashed
this year by the Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, in
which the Court ruled that public employees making statements in the
course of their official duties are not speaking as citizens for First Amend-
ment purposes. In so holding, the Court declared that government employ-
ers need a "significant degree of control over their employees' words and
actions [because] without [that control], there would be little chance for the
efficient provision of public services.,
55
In Garcetti, Richard Ceballos, a prosecutor in the Los Angeles Dis-
trict Attorney's Office, wrote an internal memo claiming that a police affi-
davit for a search warrant had contained lies.56 Ceballos then filed suit
claiming he was "demoted, denied a promotion and transferred for trying to
make an injustice known. 57 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy
stated that when a citizen becomes an employee of the government, he or
she "by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.,
58
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Souter stated, "[p]rivate and
public interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to health and
safety can outweigh the government's stake in the efficient implementation
of policy, and when they do public employees who speak on these matters
in the course of their duties should be eligible to claim First Amendment
protection. 59 If anything, Justice Souter thought the Majority's ruling coun-
terintuitive, noting that an employee's statement about a subject matter that
falls within his duties as an employee of the government has greater value to
society than mere conjecture from uninformed citizens.60 The American
54 Sangrey Callahan et al., Whistleblowing: Australian, U.K., and US. Approaches to
Disclosure in the Public Interest, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 879, 893 (2004).
55 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006).
56 See Ann McFeatters, An Ominous Decision for Whistleblowers and the Nation, SCRIPPS
HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, June 1, 2006, http://www.shns.com/shns/g_index2.cfm?action=det
ail&pk=WATCH-06-01-06.
57 Rebecca Carr, High Court Limits Whistleblower Right to Free Speech, Cox NEWS
SERVICE, June 1, 2006, http://www.coxwashington.com/reporters/content/reporters/stories/
2006/06/01/BC SCOTUSWHISTLEBLOWERS31 COX.html.
58 Garcetti, at 1958.
5' Id. at 1963.
60 See id. at 1965.
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Civil Liberties Union has warned that the Garcetti case "seriously under-
mines the rights of whistleblowers who risk their careers to protect the pub-
lic interest.",61 Mark Zaid, a Washington-based lawyer who represents whis-
tleblowers warns that the Court's ruling will lead to "a drone working envi-
ronment where government employees do little to nothing to report possible
misconduct out of fear of retaliation.
'" 62
VI. CONCLUSION AND A MODEST PROPOSAL
Without government whistleblowers with the courage to go to the
press, we would not know about the Watergate scandal in the 1970s or the
Iran-Contra scandal in the 1980s. We would not know that the government
tried to mislead the public by denying the existence of genocide in Bosnia
and Rwanda in the 1990s. We would not know that the FBI ignored infor-
mation about the 9/11 hijackers in 2001. We would not know that United
States personnel engaged in inhumane practices at Abu Ghraib prison in
Iraq. We would not know that the United States ran secret torture prisons in
Eastern Europe. And we would not know that the National Security Agency
routinely engaged in domestic wiretapping without warrants. These disclo-
sures initiated vital public debate and prompted important corrective actions
and reforms.
Despite the federal and state laws that purport to facilitate such
whistleblowing for the public good, government whistleblowers routinely
have faced loss of promotion, harassment, firing, and in some instances
criminal prosecution when they have gone public with their important in-
formation.63 As described above, the Supreme Court has recently opined
that the First Amendment does not apply to government whistleblowers;
lower courts have required "irrefutable proof' of wrongdoing before the
protections of the federal and state whistleblowing statutes will apply; and
the federal and state whistleblowing protection laws do not consider jour-
nalists an appropriate whistleblowing outlet, despite the power of the media
to bring about change.
To remedy this situation, federal and state whistleblowing laws
should be amended to protect government officials from retaliation or
prosecution when they disclose information to the media if the whistle-
blower (1) has a reasonably good faith belief that her allegations are accu-
61 McFeatters, supra note 56.
62 Carr, supra note 57.
63 The U.S. Department of Justice has launched criminal investigations to track down
persons who leaked information about the National Security Agency's domestic surveillance
program and about the existence of secret CIA detention centers in Eastern Europe to the
New York Times and the Washington Post, respectively. See Scott Shane, Bipartisan Support
Emerges for Federal Whistleblowers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at AI7.
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rate and that disclosure is necessary to avoid serious harm; (2) has ex-
hausted internal procedures unless she reasonably believes that disclosure
would subject her to retaliation, or that the employer would conceal or de-
stroy the evidence if alerted; and (3) publicly identifies herself as the source
of the information. 64 Such a provision would serve as a statutory "defense of
necessity,,, 65 specifically tailored to the case of whistleblowing.
This amendment would encourage government insiders to report
government wrongdoing to the press when necessary (evaluated under an
objective standard) to prevent serious harm to the public. To qualify for the
protections of the Statute, the harm in question could be physical (e.g.,
death, disease, or physical abuse), financial (e.g., loss of or damage to prop-
erty), or psychological (e.g., invasion of privacy, or inducing terror), but
lower level harms (e.g., injustice, deception, and waste) would under most
circumstances not be sufficient to meet this standard. The requirement of a
good faith reasonable belief about the accuracy of the claim and about the
need for public release of the information, together with the requirement
that the whistleblower publicly identify herself as the source of the informa-
tion, would ensure that neither reckless whistleblowers nor those with vin-
dictive motives are protected. Finally, the requirement that the whistle-
blower must first attempt to go through established channels before publicly
revealing the information in question would preclude precipitous whistle-
blowing or unnecessarily undermining the employer-employee relationship.
In sum, the government whistleblower who in good faith discloses
information to the press should no longer be treated as an enemy of the
state; rather, such a person should be viewed "like the knock at the door that
wakes one in a house on fire-unwelcome, but better than sleeping till the
fire reaches the bed. 66
64 This proposal is modeled loosely on the United Kingdom approach, which protects
whistleblowers who disclose information to the media if the whistleblower:
[(1)] acts in good faith; [(2)] reasonably believes that his or her allegations are sub-
stantially accurate; [(3)] does not seek personal gain; [(4)] has previously disclosed
substantially identical information internally or to another legally-designated re-
cipient, unless he reasonably believes that he would be subject to retaliation for do-
ing so, or that the employer would conceal or destroy the evidence if alerted; and
[(5)] acts reasonably.
Callahan et al., supra note 54, at 893-94.
65 Also known as the "choice of evils" defense, the "necessity" defense has been recog-
nized by the U.S. Supreme Court. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1980).
66 Michael Davis, Whistleblowing, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL ETHICS 539,
561-62 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2003).
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